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ABSTRACT 
Anders was a preeminent critic of technology and critic of the atomic bomb as he saw this 
hermeneutico-phenomenologically in the visceral sense of being and time: the sheer that of its 
having been used (where the Nietzschean dialectic of the ‘having been’ reflects the essence of 
modern technology) as well as the bland politics of nuclear proliferation functions as 
programmatic aggression advanced in the name of defense and deterrence.  The tactic of 
sheerly technological, automatic, mechanical, aggression is carried out in good conscience. 
The preemptive strike is, as Baudrillard observed, the opponent’s fault: such are the wages of 
evil.  Violence in good conscience characterizes the postwar, cold war era and the present day 
with its mushrooming effects of neo-fascism under the titles of national security and anti-
terrorism. Karl Krauss’ 1913 bon mot regarding psychoanalysis as the very insanity it claims 
to cure [Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für deren Therapie sie sich halt] has never been 
more apt for political translation — straight into the heart of what Lacan called the Real 
which has ‘always been’ the political register.  Where Habermas and heirs have tended to 
disregard Anders (as they also sidestep Heidegger and Nietzsche), just as most philosophers 
of technology (and indeed philosophers of science) have ignored the political as well as the 
ethical in their eagerness to avoid suspicion of technophobia, we continue to require both 
critical theory and a critical philosophy of technology, a conjunction incorporating Ander’s 
complicated dialectic less of art in Benjamin’s prescient but still innocent age of technological 
reproduction but and much rather “on the devastation of life in the age of the third 
industrial revolution.” Thus rather than reading Anders’ critique of the bomb as limited to a 
time we call the Atomic Age — as Anders himself varied Samuel Beckett’s 1957 Endgame 
(Fin de partie) as Endzeit that is “Endtime,” here invoking the eschatological language of 
Jacob Taubes as Anders does — this essay connects his reflections on the bomb with his 
critique of technology and the obsolescence of humanity as of a piece with our dedication to 
hurling ourselves against our own mortality. This concern with the violence of technology, 
this hatred of the vulnerability of having been born and having been set on a path unto 
death (the mortal path that is the path of life) inspires Anders’ engagement with the sons of 
Eichmann — the heirs of those who designed and executed the Nazi death camps and 
extermination chambers of the Holocaust — and the sons of Claude Eatherly — the heirs of 
both those who designed and those who as pilots (banality of banality) deployed the 
bombings that exploded nothing the stuff of the sun itself against the Empire of the Sun in 
the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  We, embroiled as we are in wartime after wartime, 
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suppressing public protest on a scale like never before, in country after country across the 
globe, cannot dispense with Anders today. 
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The door in front of us bears the inscription 
“Nothing will have been” and from within: “Time 
was an episode.” Not however as our ancestors 
had hoped, between two eternities; but one 
between two nothingnesses; between the 
nothingness of that which, remembered by no 
one, will have been as though it had never been, 
and the nothingness of that which will never be. 
— Günther Anders, Commandments in the Atomic 
Age1 
 
 
1. Angels 
 
Walter Benjamin, Günther Anders’ cousin, had traced the mystical art of the 
one and only Paul Klee, his possession, which he had acquired from Gershom 
Scholem, of Klee’s 1920 Angelus Novus, now the iconic postcard on every 
college teacher’s door, the angel of history, to recollect the word painting of the 
open mouth “His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread,”2 so 
that we can conflate as we do, Klee and Benjamin, one with the other.  
 
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though 
he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. … 
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, 
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing 
                                                            
1 Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot, 
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by 
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11. 
2 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Benjamin, Illuminations: 
Essay and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), p. 257. 
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from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the 
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into 
the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him 
grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.3 
 
 
Fig. 1. Paul Klee, Angelus Novus, 1920.  
Gift of Fania and Gershom Scholem, Jerusalem; Courtesy of the Israel Museum, Jerusalem. 
 
In an end time, that is to say, at the end of time, the strobe light of horror 
showed the still figure, the frozen figure of the angel of every apocalypse. And 
of course, let us think of Rilke, and his Duino Elegies, angels were on everyone’s 
lips. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich.   
Aren’t they all?  Where are you when you see angels? What has become of 
your life, what has become of your eyes, that you can see angels?  Günther 
Anders explores the mode of such modalities, können and nicht können , to be 
able to and not to be able to, as opposed to Shakespeare’s rag in Jack Benny’s 
voice and the filmic icon of the same, Nazi Germany, Hollywood style: to be, 
not to be, being and non-being.  Non-being as a possibility, real in a different 
sense than it had ever been before for any time since we humans had become, in 
Hölderlin’s words, a conversation with ourselves, for ourselves. For Anders, as 
he writes in 1975, these are old-fashioned worries, the problem now as ever is to 
come to terms with what we have learned to do.  
                                                            
3 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” p. 257-258. 
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This is also the source of and point for Anders’ invocation of Goethe’s 1797 
‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’ [Der Zauberlehrling] and not only because 
Hollywood had translated this figure to the film center of a cartoon musical 
opera, Fantasia. Once again we cite: “We are incapable of not being able to do 
what has once been done. It is thus not can-do-ability [Können] that we lack, 
but no-can-do-ability [Nichtkönnen].”4  Anders is well aware of the Goethean 
source of his insight but he traces this with Heideggerian precision, indeed a 
Nietzschean acuity — Nietzsche always claimed that one had to have many 
eyes — towards the prospect of understanding the end-time, as this time, our 
time, is the time of ending things, everything, the world, ourselves, and every 
other thing on it. For Anders, as for Nietzsche as I have argued in connection 
with Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science, as for Heidegger as I also 
underline his philosophy of modern technology, what is important is to consider 
the ultimate, the further consequences in every case.  Thus where scholarship 
looks to certain genocides, but not to others, Anders traces the inevitable 
lockstep of the ability to destroy and the inability to locate or to place the 
blame on this people, this political constellation, rather than that. And that 
mucks up everything for the political theorists, the political philosophers, the 
pundits and the casual reader all of whom find themselves asking how he dare 
say such things.  And so we bring in the experts to tell us that Anders was 
simply a polemicist, a ketzer, hetzer, or as we say in English: a pain in the neck.  
Which bluntness coheres with the terms Anders used to characterize school or 
university scholarship. The higher your position, the better the school you find 
yourself at, the more you fit the mold: without exception.  And Anders refused 
appointments because he knew that there was no way to change anything from 
within: the only thing that university appointments do is produce university 
rank and file, lockstep as true for the most cutting edge grad student as for the 
most distinguished professor. If few of us have read Anders, certain scholars 
over the years have done so and have had recourse to him in their work from  
Peter Sloterdijk to Jurgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology 
who cites Anders’ differentiation of the ordinary thinking of end-times 
traditionally speaking from the thinking of such times in a nuclear era: “a 
naked apocalypse, that is to say an apocalypse without a kingdom.”5  But I 
mention the non-reading because in a scholarly world where Heidegger is read, 
                                                            
4 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens in Zeitalter der 
dritten industriellen Revolution (Munich: Beck, 1984), p. 395. 
5 Jurgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology (Fortress Press, May 1, 2004), 
p. 217, here citing Anders, Endzeit und Zeitende, 1959. 
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even if he is often deplored, or where Adorno is studied, with all the limits that 
go along with that and where Benjamin is even revered, there is simply no 
excuse for leaving out this fellow traveler when it comes to the themes of power 
and violence. 
It is violence in perfect good conscience that characterizes war as it 
characterizes the postwar, the cold war era but also the present day with its 
mushrooming effects of neo-fascism under the titles of national security and the 
terrorist, from surveillance to full-body (meaning-naked body) searches to 
surgical strikes to individual-sized Armageddon in the form of drones, all in the 
name of anti-terrorism. Karl Krauss’ 1913 bon mot regarding psychoanalysis as 
the very insanity it claims to cure [Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für 
deren Therapie sie sich halt] has never been more apt for a political translation 
straight into the heart of what Jacques Lacan called the Real which has of 
course ‘always been’ the true political register.6 It is not for nothing that Zizek 
was not only a philosopher as a young man but a student of the thinking of 
Lacan in Paris.  Where Habermas and his heirs disregard Anders (as they also 
manage to set aside or minimally to sidestep Heidegger and Nietzsche and so 
on), just as most philosophers of technology (and indeed philosophers of 
science) have ignored the political as well as the ethical in their eagerness to 
avoid suspicion of technophobia — a reserve that characterizes most political 
theory that considers technology from George Kateb to john McCormick 
(Gilbert Germaine is an exception, John Street is an exception, Langdon 
Winner too is an exception) but who reads these thinkers?  Latour is no 
exception, that’s the deal, and so we read him. Say truth to power in the 
academy and you are out. And Günther Anders (as well analysed by so many 
authors) was always already ‘out,’ excluded from the academy.7 And as he 
                                                            
6 See for this, Babich, “On the Order of the Real: Nietzsche and Lacan” in: David Pettigrew 
and François Raffoul, eds., Disseminating Lacan (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1996), pp. 48-63. 
7 There are a number of authors who write in German on Anders. Note that to say this is not 
to claim that his work is particularly ‘well-received” at the university level, indeed these days 
in Germany Nietzsche’s work not to mention Heidegger’s or even Adorno’s work is 
increasingly less discussed especially in philosophy departments, and it is not even necessary 
to have read Adorno let alone specialized in work in order to be named a recipient of the 
prestigious Adorno Prize which Anders himself was honored to receive in 1983.  See, for 
example, the contributions to be found in  Konrad Paul Liessmann, ed., Günther Anders 
kontrovers (Munich: Beck, 1992) or else Margret Lohmann’s dissertation, Philosophieren in der 
Endzeit. Zur Gegenwartsanalyse von Günther Anders (Munich: Fink, 1996) or indeed Ludger 
Lütkehaus, Philosophieren nach Hiroshima. Über Günther Anders (Frankfurt am Main: 
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continues to be left out, the following is only an effort to count him in. The 
reader will, I hope, forgive me, if my style is also open to other names along the 
way. 
 
 
2. Time 
 
We are used, we modern authors, to positioning ourselves in time. And we long 
ago forgot Augustine’s cautionary warning that we take ourselves to know such 
an ordinary notion as time.8 Even those who reflect on Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustran reflections on time tend to skip over the literally contradictory 
contours of Augenblick, the intersecting courses, past and future, colliding in the 
gateway Moment. Despite the warning title Of the Vision and the Riddle. 
Nietzsche scholars simply solve the problem or are sure that there was never a 
problem in the first place. 
Thus we scholars, we scientists, we knowers, all pronounce on time: we claim 
that it speeds up (when we are having fun, when we are busy, when we are late) 
and complain that it slows down (when we are waiting for an anxiously 
anticipated event, when we are bored, when we are boiling water) and we descry 
and map the lines of time.  
Time always seems to have a spatial dimensionality, thus Günther Anders 
reflects on the absurdity of defining let alone distinguishing the two, and he 
reflects too on the absurdity of the project, pointing out that and just to be 
sure, and as the average person might answer that he has never once found 
himself in danger of “confusing the one with the other.”9  
By comparison with Jacob Taubes and Hans Jonas and many others of the 
day, arguably also including Anders’ cousin Walter Benjamin all of whom 
either wrote volumes on eschatology or essays on the same, Anders offers us no 
more than an anti-eschatology: reflections on the end, of the apocalypse, on 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1992) as well as Lütkehaus’ Schwarze Ontologie. Über Günther 
Anders (Lüneburg: zu Klampen, 2002). In English studies heretofore are limited to Paul van 
Dijk, Anthropology in the Age of Technology, The Philosophical Contribution of Günther Anders 
(Amsterdam, 2000) as well as my own essay, which was itself originally published in German, 
Babich, “O, Superman! or Being Towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther 
Anders, and Media Aesthetics,” Divinatio (January 2013): 83-99. 
8 “What then is time’? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I want to explain it to someone 
who asks, I don’t know.” Augustine, Confessions, XI, 14. 
9 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im 
Zeitalter der dritten Industriellen Revolution. (Munich: Beck, 1984 [1980]), p. 350. 
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annihilation, mutually assured and what not, which is to say that he writes 
about  the “endtime,” saying to be sure that “the future has already ended.” 
Where Anders differs from others is that he brings his philosophical, even his 
theological reflections as we shall see down to earth.  Anders who has little 
patience as Adorno with Heidegger but who, unlike Adorno had no problem 
using Heideggerian insights wherever needed, could rebuke Heidegger for 
describing the human being as the ‘shepherd of being.’ And if religious and 
poetic associations serve the image of the shepherd well, the philosophical 
image of the shepherd has been problematic since Thrasymachus, handily 
floored Socrates by pointing out that there is no difference between shepherd 
and tyrant: from the view point of the ones “shepherded,” that would be the 
sheep as it is they that are preserved for ends that are not their own and it is 
they that are always brutally killed in the end.  
But even if one hears the language poetically, through every bucolic register, 
and even if one hears the language through the tonalities of the New 
Testament, Heidegger’s language still misses the point for Anders,  
 
“The Shepherd of Being,” that which Heidegger still yet very biblically, 
that is to say anthropocentrically, suggests – whereby he vastly overrates 
“the position of the human being in the cosmos” (which couldn’t give a 
damn about whether we continue to exist or have already disappeared), 
no, we are certainly not “shepherds of being.” Far rather we might 
consider ourselves the “shepherds of our product- and gadget-world” as a 
world that needs us, more strikingly than we do ourselves, as servants 
(e.g., as consumers or possessors).10 
 
The language is the language that runs throughout the first volume 
composed as a monograph in 1956 (the second volume is put together seriatim 
and published in 1980) and that is the language of obsolescence: the human 
being is at an end, as it were and all time henceforth is and can only be at an 
end, the end of days, the end time. Where traditional eschatologies take a leap 
into the mystical, the gnostic, the beyond, Anders stays squarely in the here 
and now. Because for Anders that is where the end transpires: not later, not in a 
world to come, but always already here. 
These reflections on time are compelling for Anders above all not for religio-
theological reasons, like the aforementioned Taubes or else like Jonas but and 
                                                            
10 Ibid., p. 281. 
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not even for the traditionally epistemological reasonings of a Kant, but just on 
moral grounds. If Anders thus begins his second volume by reflecting on the 
inversion of the Lords’ Prayer, Give us this day our daily bread,’ into a new 
mantra, ‘give us this day our daily eaters,’ what is required is the same culinary 
desperation Adorno also discoved at the heart of the culture industry: the world 
needs consumers, social followers, more than it needs products because, as 
Anders already noted, this is Heideggerian challenging forth replete with 
Machenschaft, the Beiträge plus the lectures to the club of Bremen, and Anders 
is much punchier, we make products to make products to make products. To 
this extent marketing and the production of market is our only occupation and 
preoccupation. To this end all advertising and what is today’s digital marketing 
but advertising? What is today’s academic hot topic, the digital humanities, 
but advertising? Anders’ point is that the only imperatives we know are the 
imperatives of what can be done: if it can be done, it should be done. Heidegger 
says this too, of course, and to this day our sole concern is not with what one 
should do, what a quaintly Kantian question, but how we might do and how we 
might forever continue to do (this is the meaning of what we call 
‘sustainability) what we can do: Das Gekonnte is das Gesollte. As a result Anders 
has even less patience, if that is possible, with the idea that technology might 
be some neutral means (he has a field day with the language of ends and means 
when it comes to the atomic bomb and the point of its production) or that it 
might be somehow be in our control or even within our purview.  The epigraph 
Anders sets to the second volume as a whole is significant: “It is not enough to 
change the world.”  Writing in 1980, one is well beyond any imperative that 
would call for changing the world, in a good Marxian voice, just because as 
Anders writes, we always do that anyway. What is lacking is an interpretation 
of what we have done, especially in our times where, as he argues, our ability to 
act far exceeds our comprehension. Later in the book, written two years earlier, 
his chapter on “The Obsolescence of History” will make the same point again 
with a trio of dated epigraphs — and, in a way, only the dates should strike us 
in this trifecta:  
 Politics is our destiny (1815) 
 The economy is our destiny (1845) 
 Technology is our destiny (1945)  
 
3. New Rules 
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In the ‘commandments’ originally published in 1957 which Günther Anders 
manages to insert into English-language circulation by sharing them with 
Claude Eatherly, the weather reconnaisance pilot, who gave the go-ahead, or all 
clear for the bombing of Hiroshima. Two points first: dropping an atomic bomb 
is a very different thing than ordinary bombing missions. If, for the safety of 
the bombers themselves, weathermen always played a crucial role, in this case 
one needed to know still more about wind and weather than ordinarily so, for 
the very idea of precision bombing would be crucial. Secondly, the trajectory of 
flight path, immediately evasive, flying up and away after dropping the bomb, 
also testifies to this difference. If bombers are inevitably at a distance from the 
work of their actions, those who dropped the bombs over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were and had to be clear about the devastation they would bring 
because the backwash in this case could touch them in the sky. Eatherly was 
infamous not for having flown the mission, he was of course, like every 
successful bomber, a war hero, but for having had second thoughts about it.  
In the commandments Anders sent to Eatherly, we can read, as if it were the 
highest moral imperative and this is indeed how Anders meant it: “widen your 
sense of time.”11  Anders has his reasons for this as he introduces this broadened 
sense of time by calling for an equally broadened breadth of ‘moral fantasy:’12 
you must broaden your ethical sensibility “until imagination and feeling 
become able to comprehend and to realize the enormity of your doings.”13 
Anders who was concerned with the phenomenological effects of the end-
time [Endzeit], was also concerned what he calls the “guiltless guilty” as this 
ontological characteristic is now the destiny of the human, following the 
objective, physical, thingly circumstances of the modern technological era. 
Anders used the word ‘technicity,’ to the irritation of newspaper commentators: 
the same irritation has meant that scholars and popular authors could 
successfully ignore Anders just as they have ignored Jacques Ellul, and to a 
lesser degree Martin Heidegger on the same topics.  
By contrast Marshall McLuhan would be inhaled. Technology can’t be the 
problem: the medium is, the message is.  
                                                            
11 Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot, 
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by 
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 13. See too the more mainstream title, William 
Bradford Huie, The Hiroshima Pilot: The Case of Major Claude Eatherly (New York: Putnam, 
1964). 
12 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 13.  
13 Ibid. 
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In his correspondence with Eatherly, which if I am correct was Anders’ way 
to communicate with American English speaking commentators, Anders did 
not make it difficult for those same commentators to dismiss him. Indeed, 
Anders put his key point, which was also his most difficult point, on the very 
first page, almost summing up the heart of the masterwork that has yet to be 
translated into English.  Thus Anders writes to Eatherly — a letter to a former 
American airman, incarcerated for petty crimes in a psychological hospital or 
institution (where for the most part Eatherly would remain) and hence written 
out of the blue, as it were — by speaking of nothing more esoteric than 
‘technification,’ speaking in a Heideggerian sense but no less in a Kantian sense 
of what Anders there describes as the: 
 
 “technification” of our being: the fact that to-day it is possible that 
unknowingly and indirectly, like screws in a machine, we can be used in 
actions, the effects of which are beyond the horizon of our eyes and 
imagination, and of which, could we imagine them, we could not approve 
— this fact has changed the very foundations of our moral existence. 
Thus, we can become “guiltlessly guilty,” a condition which had not 
existed in the technically less advanced times of our fathers.14 
 
By thus speaking of our ‘technification,’ the same technology on every social 
level that Jacques Ellul would for his part claim as the wager [Enjeu] of the 
century in a series of his own books,15 or of what Heidegger far less popularly 
called the “essence” of modern technology, Anders could emphasize that it 
would be this same essence into we ourselves would be absorbed. Thus  Anders’ 
first letter to Eatherly patiently articulates the points Anders had developed in 
his 1956 Obsolescence of Humanity.16   
For Anders, we are our tools, that is to say, we are our gadgets, our devices, 
our things, our objects. By saying this, Anders is far from today’s object 
oriented ontologists (I say this admitting the wide variability of these writers, 
and I say this noting that in some cases Anders is even cited —and the sighting 
of any citation, in the wild as it were, is rare enough). But Anders differs. He 
                                                            
14 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 1. 
15 Jacques Ellul, The Technologcial Society, John Wilkinson, trans. (New York: Vintage, 
1967). The original title was in advance of Anders’ work: La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1954). 
16 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens in 
Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution (Munich: Beck, 1984 [1980]). 
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does not think that we can simply think the thing, the object, the gadget and 
his reason for this reticence is the very hermeneutic and phenomenological 
reason that this objective is not accessible to us simply because we are already 
the object of technology as the subject of history, and hence we are ordered to 
(in this sense as we saw above we are the shepherds of), we are claimed by 
things, by objects. The fact that we have made them is quite irrelevant and this 
irrelevance as this is the scope, the range, the breadth, the sheer size  (this is 
Jünger’s titanism or giganticism),of modern technology. And, as we shall see, 
this same signal irrelevance of the connection between what we know and what 
we have made or done, pace Kant or Vico, is the point of Anders’ reflections on 
Goethe’s “The Sorceror’s Apprentice,” Der Zauberlehrling. 
Anders’ main concern was the same non-neutrality that Heidegger for his 
own part also emphasized at the start of his The Question Concerning 
Technology. Good or bad, neutral or non-neutral, either point is committed in 
advance to the same.   Anders’ argument is that once we have an object, we 
have it. Because it is the object that has us — we can, as a result, claim neither 
detachment nor sovereignty.  Other authors reflecting on technology have made 
similar points in similarly uncompromising fashion especially Heidegger and 
Ellul but what bears further reflection is that Anders’ point would not be 
directed to the ontological circumstance of doing and not doing. Thus Anders 
was more concerned for very phenomenological purposes with ‘having.’ And 
this also meant that Anders’ concern was with the inescapably moral 
fraughtness: this is what it is to be ‘guitlessly guilty,’ this is what it means for 
all of us, to accept the designation of banal evil as a descriptor for all us, every 
one of us a son of Eichmann, Hiroshima everywhere.  
The condemnation for Anders is the damnation of being and not being in the 
context of the things of our age.  There is no way to be, simply to be, in the 
world in the wake of the atom bomb.  It is in this sense that Anders can reflect 
in 1966 and contra Lukács and many others, that given the literally ‘negative 
religion’ that was the atomic fact — and by no means only the mere threat of 
nuclear annihilation — everything the past century had previously considered 
under the rubric of nihilism, by comparison with that same “possibility of 
‘annihilation’ turned out to be sheer culture-hall nonsense.” For Anders, 
“Nietzsche, even the beastly serious Heidegger, come across as laughable before 
the madness [Folie] of this possibility.”17 The possibility is that of a literal 
annihilation, in fact the creation, the production of nothingness, eliminating all 
                                                            
17 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 404. 
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humanity and culture and all history with it. The question of nuclear 
annihilation thus explicitly extends beyond the Heideggerian possibility of 
impossibility. This is of course the heart of what Anders, a good Heideggerian, 
had to mean by the Obsolescence of Humanity, which is of course nothing but the 
‘Obsolescence of Dasein’ and precisely qua Dasein or as such. What is at stake 
for us as mortal beings is no longer anything so classical as our mere mortality, 
that we, as beings who can die, are bound to die and bound to the loss of our 
ownmost possibilities for being but and much rather that today we are no 
longer ‘mortal’ but have been converted into simply “‘killable’ entities.”18  
For Anders, as we have already quoted him in the epigraph to the current 
essay, we human beings are no longer in a position to simply regard our 
lifetime, even as Mallarmé might have done, as simply random, a chance tossed 
into the realm of possible being, or as Nietzsche wrote: “a hiatus between two 
nothings.”19  Adding the enclosure Commandments in the Atomic Age, to his 
letter to Claude Eatherly, it is immediately clear upon reading them, that the 
traditional spiritual exercises would count as more appropriate title that 
Commandments, these are rather more rules for the direction of the soul, 
meditations of a Stoic kind, literally beginning as Marcus Aurelius begins Book 
Five of own Meditations: let this rather than that be your first thought upon 
arising. 
 The point here is that there has been a reversal, a turn, a change and things 
are now and forever more no longer as they were.  If that sounds extreme it is 
only because Anders remembers, as Benjamin does, what makes history history 
and that prerequisite is always a recording hand.  With an angel, we are covered 
even after the apocalypse.  Take away the angel and you have as Nietzsche also 
reflects, as he writes in the parable of the mad man who comes to seek and then 
to announce the death of god in his The Gay Science, that having murdered god 
— “We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers.”20 — we have at 
the same time managed “to wipe away the entire horizon.”21  Nietzsche 
continues to elaborate the significance of nothing other than the very last words 
                                                            
18 Ibid., 405.  Anders concludes the section by denouncing the situatedness of dying one’s 
own death as Rilke had spoken of this and as Heidegger had made his own claim to the same.  
For Anders, using a Heideggerian argument against Heidegger, the thing about dying is that 
the individual’s loss of his own singularity in dying is and can hardly be one’s “own.”  Ibid., 
p. 407. 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), Vol. 12, p. 473. 
20 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §125. 
21 Ibid.  
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of the Christ as he hung on the cross, asking for forgiveness on our  behalf, 
because we his murderers, guiltlessly guilty, had and could have had no idea 
what we were doing:   
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither 
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we 
not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? 
Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite 
nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become 
colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?22 
 
The scene of the commandments as Anders translator put his Meditations in 
the Atomic Age is as bleak. In the wake not of the death of god, but the 
explosion of the power of stars, we are, in Anders’ terms “ killable,’: as 
humankind and as a whole, not only henceforth but in every other sense as well. 
Thus humanity as such is not only limited to “today’s mankind” or “spread 
over the provinces of our globe; but also mankind spread over the provinces of 
time.”23 The expanse is literally unimaginable — which does not mean that 
Anders has any trouble explaining it, and he gives Eatherly a little lesson in 
history as he does:  
 
For if the mankind of today is killed, then that which has been, dies with 
it; and the mankind to come too. The mankind which has been because, 
where there is no one who remembers, there will be nothing left to 
remember; and the mankind to come, because where there is no to-day, 
no to-morrow can become a to-day. The door in front of us bears the 
inscription “Nothing will have been” and from within: “Time was an 
episode.” Not however as our ancestors had hoped, between two 
eternities; but one between two nothingnesses; between the nothingness 
of that which, remembered by no one, will have been as though it had 
never been, and the nothingness of that which will never be.24 
 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot, 
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by 
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11. 
24 Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot, 
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by 
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11. 
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Anders’ own expression is shot through with the Nietzschean language, the 
door or the gateway, as we have already seen, is Nietzschean, the formula of the 
two nothingnesses, as we also have seen, is Nietzschean, but the tenor and the 
tone is hermeneutic phenomenology: a meditation on being and having been, on 
being and not being. This is the Sophoclean me phynai,25  as Nietzsche also 
reflects on it, on what it would be never to have been at all, where just this is, as 
Nietzsche also reflects, utterly impossible for humanity, which leaves us the 
curiously second best option of dying soon, as Yeats translates Sophocles and 
sets as the last lines of his A Man Young and Old,  
 
“Never to have lived is best, ancient writers say; 
Never to have drawn the breath of life, never to have looked into 
the eye of day; 
The second best’s a gay goodnight and quickly turn away.”26  
 
Anders who brings to his reflections literary considerations amidst 
philosophical and theological considerations also argues in the high spirit of the 
original members of the Frankfurt School (neither Habermas nor Honneth need 
apply, nor, to be sure, would they wish to). Thus Anders compares the 
“consumer terrorism,” he describes, i.e., say compulsory consumption, to the 
even more significant compulsion to use.  This is the compulsion of the applied.  
Applied terrorism is the terrorism of what happens to be on hand, what is 
available for use, and this applicable and therefore deployable terrorism is for 
Anders quite literally the reason atom bombs were detonated as they were and 
in the first place: President Truman, as Anders points out, happened to have 
had two bombs available, therefore there would be two targets. The only 
question was where they would be. That is the space question. The time 
question concerned only how soon they could be used. And given diplomacy 
and the ontic details of concluding world war two, Germany was out of the 
question, so the space in question, the where of the bomb, followed the question 
of time, the when of when the two bombs one happened finally to have on 
hand, could ultimately get to be used.  
But beyond consumer-terrorism and applied-terrorism, beyond having 
become less mortal than mere ‘killable’ beings, Anders reflects that we are killed 
                                                            
25Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonnus, « mê phunai ton hapanta nikai logon: to d’, epei phanêi… » 
(1224f) 
26 W. B. Yeats, A Man Young and Old, in The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats: Volume I: The 
Poems, ed. Robert Finneran (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 231. 
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when we are killed by an atom bomb not by human hands, and by nothing so 
old-fashionedly humane as human intention or human passion.  We do not die 
at human hands because hands — that’s the point of obsolescence — do not for 
Anders enter into it at all. Like Major Claude Eatherly who gives the all-clear 
from his plane, The Straight Flush,27 and thus like the command to execute the 
mission, like the bombers of the Enola Gay, who dropped the ridiculously aptly 
named hydrogen bomb: Little Boy, such a death when it comes, would come 
either, shades of Eichmann (but with drone warfare the shadow falls more 
clearly) come 
 
from agents somewhere, thousands of kilometers distant from us, 
following orders in accord with duty, or indeed through brainless and 
sightless machines, that have long since been emancipated from the 
hands and the intentions of their creators and users.28 
  
As Anders goes on to point out, the constellation shifts from the tragic to the 
ridiculous or idiotic, and this shift relieves us of no part of our own 
responsibility for the outcome. The overabundance, the excess production of 
nuclear warheads (this is not a matter of number as much as it is a matter of 
deadly power) is something that has been happening since 1945 — and it has 
hardly decreased it has only intensified in recent years. With every increase in 
“overkill,” Anders likes to use the term in English in his German text, what also 
increases is the likelihood that each of us has now to perish at what is, in effect, 
however objectly or mechanically, our own hand.29  We are all at fault. The 
consequence, if one is blunt, and Anders was blunt to a fault, is that one could 
no longer, though this hardly stops todays philosophers of religion, from talking 
as if God were in his heaven.  Thus “Scheler’s dictum,” as Anders quotes it here, 
that “he believed in the devil (in contrast to the theologians of his own 
generation who believed in the existence of god but not the devil)”30 would thus 
                                                            
27 A “straight flush” is jargon for a poker hand of five cards in sequence and of which there 
are better and worse kinds. In Eatherly’s case, the name of his B-29 Superfortess was 
illustrated on the nose of the plane with a depiction of a toilet bowl with a downed Japanese 
pilot in the toilet and using the toitet seat as an flotation device with a disembodied hand on 
the right-hand side poised to pull the chain, for a “straight flush.” 
28 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 406. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 407. 
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attain a new vitality for us today. As Anders argued, the devil would appear to 
have taken up a new residence.31 
Far from any symbolism, the apocalypse for Anders could henceforth have 
nothing whatsoever to do with any kind of second coming, any sort of new 
Reich, any last judgment, or anything at all that one might need to ‘interpret.’ 
What we no longer have is hermeneutic esotericism: there is no ‘meaning’ in 
need of subtle divination.  
 
Now, the End-time of today is of a ‘massive’ sort. It is in need of no 
symbolization. For this possibility (and that means if it is a matter of 
technology: the inevitability) there are historical examples: the facts 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and that of the secret from-no-one calculation 
regarding the ‘overkill’ capacity of today’s stockpiled weapons. In our 
situation the sheer fact that the end has yet to enter in is no refutation of 
the reality of the danger, no counterdemonstration of the fact that our 
time is a, indeed the endtime. 
 
The ‘Now’ of this fact of the facticity for all and for each one of us of what 
has been, of what has been done by human beings lies (or better said: should lie) 
as a weight upon all human beings. This is for Anders, the Promethean guilt of 
action, of original sin, and it has been a problem since the time of the change of 
the gods, for the ancient Greeks this was the change from the age of the titans 
to the Olympians gods, for Jews and for Christians, this goes back not only to 
Adam and Eve but above all to the time of Cain. In another way of telling the 
story, this guilt or acquired shame has been with us since Enkidu stopped to 
sleep with the woman of the city paid to seduce him, and who as a result lost 
the patience, the grace, the time that allowed him to run in innocence alongside 
the gazelle, the lion, and so on. Thereafter, Enkidu, the wild man, would not 
free the animals from the traps city hunters had set for them, but being himself 
caught in and by another kind of city hunter’s trap, he would be lost to his 
forest companions, with little to do except follow the whore who had come to 
lure him to the city.  
Sin, for Anders, Promethean shame, needs no specific confession: it is neither 
Jewish nor Christian nor pagan but purely attendant upon our humanity. It is 
the human condition that we be ashamed of having been born, that we be 
preternaturally conscious of our limits (this is what Heidegger called our 
                                                            
31 Anders writes that “the devil has moved into another apartment.” Ibid., p. 410.   
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ontological ‘excellence’) as these are the limits of the just and only human. Our 
oldest stories are stories of being ashamed of nakedness, ashamed of our naked 
bodies, of being embarrassed to be seen, appalled at our own frailty. And by the 
same token, we are hell bent on becoming, at any price, more than that, more 
than we are. Our tools, our objects, our tanks, our planes, our bombs, these 
days such things also include our digital prowess seem to be just the ticket. And 
it all starts with a fig-leaf. 
With the atom bomb in particular, humanity succeeded in crystallizing the 
terror of laying siege to a city, wasting it, compressing it down in time and 
spatial act to the press of a button, mere minutes from start to finish. Over and 
out.   
At least in theory — and as Anders already at the beginning of the 1960’s, 
writing to Eatherly took care to note (and in the interim his point has only been 
made all the stronger, in ways unimaginable to most of us — not that we think 
about it): the bomb, although hardly ever thought about (this would be 
different for Major Eatherly who knew such things far better than most) was no 
static achievement.  Indeed, since the bomb was developed, progress consisted 
in further perfecting it, meaning as this was hardly lost on Anders, that that 
same project to develop a better bomb was all and only about increasing its 
deadliness, magnifying the destructiveness of such a negative genie-in-a-bottle.  
The problem with the project from the outset, following Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, was only that the genie had already been out for a detonating fall, 
twice over. As Anders put it: 
 
For the goal that we have to reach cannot be not to have the thing; but 
never to use the thing, although we cannot help having it; never to use it, 
although there will be no day on which we couldn’t use it.32  
 
It was Anders’ technically attuned thinking, student as he was of Edmund 
Husserl — his dissertation on “Having” concerned epistemological ontology33 
— and of Heidegger, it was thus his techno-epistemological sensibility that led 
him to offer the above reflection on the consequences that follow simply from 
what we do as modern, technical human beings, living at a tempo like none 
before, “the completely new, the apocalyptic kind of temporality, our 
temporality.”34 This temporality of our time is the end-time: all time henceforth 
                                                            
32 Anders and Eatherly, Burining Consicence, p. 20. 
33  Stern, Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis (Bonn: Cohen, 1928). 
34 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 12. 
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must be counted from here and accordingly and because we are at the end, we 
affect the future, any possible future, like no other epoch in the history of 
humanity.   
Anders offers one of the first articulations of a point we now so take for 
granted that we simply refer to the concept by a number, counting generations 
— we count, biblically of course, seven generations, and then because it is now 
a cliché we stop thinking about it. As Anders explains:  
 
the people of the Western world, since they, although not planning it, are 
already affecting the remotest future. Thus deciding about the health or 
degeneration, perhaps the ‘to be or not to be’ of their sons and grandsons. 
Whether they, or rather we, do this intentionally or not is of no 
significance, for what morally counts is only the fact.35    
 
The point here is that the only thing that matters is our objects, that is, 
what we have, what we possess and what we have done. As a consequence there 
is no question of intention, there is no question of rightly or wrongly deploying 
such objects.  Atom bombs, napalm, lets make it real for us today, drone 
strikes, fracking, nuclear power plants, GMO crops, etc. These things cannot be 
used well. Thus Anders writes to conclude the second volume of his Obsolescence 
of Humanity, “it is not can-do-ability that we lack, but no-can-do-ability.”36 
Heidegger had earlier begun his own reflections on technology by taking about 
the limitations of thinking that technology was either an instrument (the 
instrumental definition) or a human attribute (the anthropological definition).37  
Instead, and much, much rather another essence, so Heidegger argued, was at 
work in modern technology.   
 
 
4. Time-Space 
 
Time, as we have seen that Anders also reflects upon it, is always found to have 
a kind topology, a spatial dimensionality, complete with the topographic 
features of a particular landscape — think of Dali’s The Persistence of Memory 
or for pop culture, think of The Twilight Zone’s milder television metaphors: we 
are time-travelers of an antique adept’s variety, less the high future of a Star 
                                                            
35 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 13. 
36 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 395.  
37 H. and then  
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Trek cruising the edge of a singularity in space-time than the late 19th century 
future of a Jules Verne.38 We hitchhike in our fantasies equipped with nothing 
like the latest scientific vision,  a mere hundred years old, of time-travel via 
rocket-ships and jet-powered speed, to take us, thank you Dr. Einstein, back in 
time without noticing it. We prefer 19th century cabinets. Dr. Who needs no 
spacesuit. Nor is it an accident that the latest language to describe the 
(imaginary) transforms of the digital are borrowed — hat tip to Evgeny 
Morozov, thanks to techno-media scholar Jussi Parikka — from Harry Potter’s 
creator. J. K. Rowling’s horcrux is the perfectly image for our divided, 
multitasking minds.  
  
 
 
Fig. 2. Salvador Dali. The Persistence of Memory. 1931. Oil on canvas. © ARS, NY 
 
Rowling, the horcrux’s creatrix, had her own borrowed rabbit (or lion) up 
her sleeve or tucked into her hat, even if she did not name the master of 
wonderland and its topographical transforms, morphological shifts of size and 
form, down the rabbit hole and all. The mathematician author Lewis Carroll 
and his ‘Wonderland’ is thus the poster-boy, the ideal author of the digital era 
because even with no acquaintance with Alice, and no acquaintance with any of 
                                                            
38 Invoking Schlegel’s description of the historian as a backwards turned prophet, an image 
doubtless precisely relevant for his cousin Benjamin’s description of the facing orientation of 
Klee’s Angel of history, Anders suggests that we need to demand the same of today’s 
prognosticator or futurologist. In this same context, Anders claims Jules Verne as the patron 
saint of modern technology: “the prophet of the technological revolution.” Anders, Die 
Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 428, 
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her adventures (who was the rabbit? who was the walrus? who needs any of 
them, we have Angelina Jolie forever in, her avatar avant la letter in Lara 
Croft: Tomb Raider), we have the very idea. Mentioning, the mere mention of 
the wondrous is all we get and all we need: we know everything we need to 
know about the mathematico-logical transform of our new projected selves.  
We are, aren’t we now, transhuman, posthuman, humanity 2.0 (surely we’re 
due for an upgrade to humanity 3.0 or even 4.0 by now). 
And then, just for the locus of the boggart in the wardrobe as such, Rowling 
also had her C.S. Lewis.   
I mention boggarts and wardrobes, cabinets and time travel, because when 
we shift levels (and note that we are still talking of topologies), one should be 
struck by the persistence of our representation of time as time in history is 
always a picture, an image, iconic.  As if we might be surprised that anything 
with two dimensions might be other than a picture. 
Theodor Adorno to bring Anders’ competition, not that we read him either 
on the matter of technology as we should, and not that today’s Frankfurt 
School bothers to do anything but silence him in favor of themselves, was also 
struck by iconic, canonic time, as Berthold Hoeckner rightly notes.39 And this is 
always a claim with particular insistence in Adorno wher music is, of course, the 
art of time as we like to say. With music we are also always and even if 
Hoeckner is, like most musicologists, most philosophers, most academics, 
inattentive to Anders (or Stern in this context) speaking about Anders who also 
(as Stern) offered his own reflections on time, musical time,40 as 
phenomenologically, as hermeneutically as Hoeckner himself.41 Hoeckner, like 
Anders, like Adorno (if also although Hoeckner does not note this, like 
Nietzsche), attends to the time of the now — Jetzt-Zeit — in his discussion of 
the ‘star’ in Beethoven, echoes of contellations important for Adorno as for 
Benjamin, Anders, and even indeed Schoenberg.42  Quoting Adorno’s 
                                                            
39 Berthold Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-century German Music and the 
and the Hermeneutics of the Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
40 I discuss Anders in this context and in connection with Adorno on the space of sound and 
Nietzsche on time in music in Babich, The Hallelujan Effect: Philosophical Reflections on 
Music, Performance Practice and Technology (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013). 
41  Hoeckner, to be sure, does not attend to the breadth of this array as I am discussing 
Anders here and to be sure he prefers the more common constellation, as most scholars do, of 
names to bother to name in his own study. 
42 Hoeckner’s reflections are broad ones but I argue here that to have the measure he wishes 
need even more damned names (in the Fortean sense) are required than Anders’ own. I am 
Angels, the Space of Time, and Apocalyptic Blindness: On Günther Anders’ Endzeit–Endtime 
 
164 
 
“aesthetics of appearance” (under the important presumption of an allergy to 
Heidegger that spares any engagement with the notion as it also appears early 
in Heidegger’s Being and Time), Hoeckner characterizes Adorno’s “aesthetics of 
Augenblick as an aesthetics of apparition: ‘the artwork as appearance 
approaches most clearly the apparition, the celestial vision.’”43 Of course as we 
have already suggested, the same lines of thinking are also to be found, traced 
and elaborated in just this context in Anders.  For Hoeckner — and here one 
misses a discussion of both Heidegger and Nietzsche, what will be needed is a 
“hermeneutics of the moment.”44 With this desideratum the author must 
disentangle himself from Adorno who exemplified perhaps more than any other 
author the lived anxieties of influence (Heidegger, and Gadamer but also 
Anders and the same Habermas Adorno had intellectually discounted but also 
and certainly, whether we like it or not — and we do not like it — Hannah 
Arendt as well). In addition, there are other authors who also write on dialectics 
and time in conjunction with Benjamin, making very close arguments for 
Hoeckner regarding Adorno’s supposed lacks, as Günter Figal has analysed 
these. Focusing, as Hoeckner does, on Adorno’s attention to the standstill, 
Hoeckner disagrees with Figal.  There are less lacunae in Adorno than an 
abundance of eyes, as it were — the image of the Argus-eyed is significant as it 
should be for Hoeckner’s reading — than a veritable constellation of insights 
into that same dialectic. Thus we read that “what intrigued Adorno was 
Benjamin’s objectification of the historical process in the image.”45 The key 
passage everyone cites from Benjamin’s Passagenwerk is thus worth citing here:  
 
What has been coalesces in lightning like fashion with the Now. In other 
words, the image is the dialectic at a standstill. For while the relationship 
of the present to the past is a purely temporal one, the relationship of 
what has been to the Now is dialectical, of a pictorial rather than a 
temporal character.46   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
speaking of the now nearly forgotten Siegmund Levarie and I discuss this (in another 
context) in Babich, The Hallelujan Effect, see p. 7 as well as 196ff. 
43 Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute, p. 16. 
44Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 17.  
46 Ibid. See for the same citation, Günter Figal’s chapter “Aesthetic Experience of Time” in 
his For a Philosophy of Freedom and Strife: Politics, Aesthetics, Metaphysics, Wayne Klein, 
trans. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 121. Figal cites Benjamin, GS 
V: 1, 578. 
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The point made here overlooks a key point in Nietzsche (and it is instructive 
that authors for all their enthusiasm, are at pains to keep Nietzsche at a 
distance). In addition there is the eschatological as such, in this case the very 
picture of it, which is the picture-book Dante, in the images inextricably 
associated with him since the 1850’s, not only for us today but for Anders, and 
Adorno, and Benjamin ever since Paul Gustave Doré’s illustrations came to 
stand in Dante’s name and place, an achievement arguably to match that of 
any other illustration in any other book. 
Doré’s pen drawing of the Empyrean in Dante’s Paradiso, Canto 31, 
published mid-19th century, combines as a rebus both the power of the sun as 
life and in death as this famously comes to J. Robert Oppenheimer’s lips as he 
invokes the language of the Vedic tradition, “Now I am become death, the 
destroyer of worlds.”47 As Peter Sloterdijk takes up this same association, the 
“Bomb is really the only Buddha that Western reason could understand. Its 
calm and its irony are infinite.  … As with Buddha, everything that could be 
said is said through its existence.”48 
 
                                                            
47 J. Robert Oppenheimer, on the thoughts and reactions on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity 
atomic bomb test site. “We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed... A 
few people cried... Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture 
the Bhagavad Gita; Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty, and 
to impress him takes on his multi-armed form, and says, ‘Now I am become death, the 
destroyer of worlds.’ I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.”  In: The Decision to 
Drop the Bomb, NBC documentary, 1965. 
48 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 131-132. 
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Fig. 3. Paul Gustave Doré, Empyrean Dante, Paradiso, Canto 31.  Public Domain. 
 
To talk about Anders Endzeit und Zeitenende,49 we need Nietzsche’s eternity 
in fact as this is the moment, the now. Again and as already intimated at the 
start, this is mapped out in space, a space of infinite dimension, fore and aft, as 
Nietzsche depicts it and without which dimensionality it is impossible to think 
the Augenblick as Nietzsche also names the moment.  Time stands still and in 
what Nietzsche could describe as two roads, mapping infinities past and future, 
the crossover, the junction is the moment, Augenblick,50 the same word Adorno 
uses.  
And why not the moment, the blink of an eye, an image which already closes 
off the seen, relegating it to a lost glimpse?  Why not in Anders’ time, in 
Adorno’s time, Benjamin’s time: a time when the apocalypse seemed sure just 
because as Anders emphasized with respect to Hiroshima, and although we 
scarcely like to talk of this at all, in Vietnam, or in Iraq as Baudrillard did not 
fail to try to tell us, or closer to home for the German Anders, already in 
Dresden, as Winifried Sebald has reminded us, it had already taken place. For 
Anders, indeed, and starting with his own experience of it, the first world war 
had already done that and the second war as that came and ended, not once, 
but twice, and then again with two bombs, could not but repeat the same 
message, once more with feeling, and a reprise, da capo. The encore at the end of 
                                                            
49 Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende. Gedanken über die atomare Situation (Munich: Beck, 1972). 
50 I explore this in further detail in Babich,  
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the second world war, and the constellation, the order of events would matter 
for Anders, changed everything beyond imagining, beyond rectification, beyond 
redemption or correction. 
This is for Anders in his retrospective reflections on the “Obsolesence of 
Space and Time” part of the problem, emphasizing, as Gadamer would also 
always do in his lectures when I was a student, the importance of 
consummation, satisfaction, fulfillment, what Anders simply called “having.” 
It is instructive that Anders begins his 1959 reflections with the illustration of 
‘Schlaraffenland’51 but it is even more significant that we can barely translate 
this term into English although we Americans have perfected its realization on 
earth arguably more than other people, at least in the Disney version.  
Schlaraffenland is a world where sausages leap perfectly broiled, perfectly 
willingly, into our always hungry mouths, no effort at all, guiltlessly, 
automatically, and in this child’s fantasy, not really for children because there 
is beer that has the same eager proclivities to satisfy any thirst we might have, 
the only name we have is Candyland, or the media obsession with the heaven of 
certain confessional persuasion: complete with a given number of promised 
virgins springing, not unlike the sausages, unbidden, uncoaxed, and unfazed 
into the martyr’s arms.  
Our age crosses space and time, obliterating, as Anders also emphasizes all 
distances, spatial and temporal. We are effectively as he argues, rendered by 
technological means into spaceless, timeless beings, not in the sense of 
transcendence but as he writes of imperviousness, blindness. This is apocalyptic 
blindness and thus we no longer have any sense of history or indeed memory.  
But the problem of the modern time-less (lacking time as we do), space-less 
(lacking a sense of the world around as we do) way of being is precisely that it 
transcends nothing at all. We are, as Anders goes on to argue, mediated in all of 
this by our technology, which is always to be found just where we put it: 
precisely, exactly “in the ‘middle’ of the fulfillment of needs or ‘facilitating’ 
[‘Vermitteln’] the manufacture of products.”52 
 
 
5. Whose Holocaust? Which Genocide? 
 
                                                            
51 Anders, „Die Antiquiertheit von Raum und Zeit,” in Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; 
Zweiter Band, p. 335.  
52 Ibid., 336. 
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If some have followed the apotheosis, as it were, of the cattle car as this was 
borrowed along with the entire factory slaughterhouse project, technique, 
assembly line-layout, and so on, from Chicago’s stockyards and thence to 
Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald,53 we can also trace the lines, the tracks of the 
trains that ran throughout a war of destroyed transports. These traintracks 
that could have been bombed were never destroyed and Hitler not only got the 
trains to run on time, but the trains that fed the final solution ran without fail. 
A transport always arrives at its destination, to vary Jacques Lacan while 
keeping the same spirit. In the same spirit, these are the ashes of which Derrida 
also speaks, Anders talked about things not even a Klee could illustrate. No 
paintings are possible, one is immediately moved to film Hiroshima, Mon 
Amour, and even that shudders. Meshes of non-representation. Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki, and we have no idea what we are talking about. And then students of 
Adorno prattle about a Bilderverbot. God forbid that we care to speak of this, of 
these people, foreign to us, in foreign places, alien beings, who are they?  We 
continue to require both critical theory and a critical philosophy of technology, 
a conjunction incorporating Anders’ complicated dialectic less of art in 
Benjamin’s prescient but still innocent age of technological reproduction but 
and much rather Ander’s reflecvtions “on the devastation of life in the age of 
the third industrial revolution.”54 Thus Anders would talk not about enemy 
fascism (which was an easy sell as many authors know to their advantage) but 
and much rather the American, the good-guys, the non-fascist, non-
(supposedly)-totalitarian, but very democratic (despite its complete secrecy) 
controversion of just-war ideology, transforming it into just and only a war 
after the war had ended. For all by themselves, in the midst of the Japanese 
effort to surrender — surrenders are diplomatic things, that take diplomatic 
intervals of time, negotiation, the business of sovereignty and legitimacy — the 
bomber’s planes would fly as for weeks, indeed for all the years of the 
Manhattan Project, it had been planned to fly just those planes, to send them 
somewhere appropriate just in order (that would be the end in question) to drop 
the winged death, the apocalypse itself. The end fruit of that same project was 
two bombs completed just prior to the end of a war (but when does anything 
end?) that was finished just a touch too soon before the planes (these would be 
the means) were nonetheless launched to destroy cities full of people. 
                                                            
53 The historian Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the 
Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2002) thus borrows its title from Singer’s “The Letter 
Writer.”  For the quote here, see Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, p. 183. 
54 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band. 
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If scholars dispute whether one can claim that ordinary German knew or did 
not know about the Holocaust, Holger Neering points out that in this case there 
is nothing to dispute.55 For more than sixty years, German authors have been at 
pains to argue, like Neering, that no one can make that statement about 
Hiroshima, about Nagasaki.56  And yet even this point can miss the point. We 
are, we remain still in the dark about the atomic attacks on Japan. Thus if the 
above description of the timing or the necessity for the bombs dropped on 
Japan sounds like an overstatement, that is because, as Americans, we continue 
to be in denial, we are, as Anders offered Eatherly a diagnosis for his mental 
distress at a distance, are traumatized. And this trauma today is the result of, 
as trauma always perpetuates itself as trauma, by means of suppression.  
The development of the atom bomb was asecret during World War II (not 
only the project as such was a secret but three different locations were created, 
likewise in secret, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (uranium), Hanford, Washington 
(plutonium) and today the best known of these: Los Alamos, New Mexico. As 
one cultural scholar has observed, the development of the bomb, which 
involved building the aforenamed cities from scratch, was arguably the best kept 
secret of the war. Bertolotti’s analysis is offered by way of an old fashioned sort 
of what is today popularly called media archaeology, by way, with perfect 
documentation, of a study of print media as the means of both suppression and 
controlled dissemination (translation: that is propaganda, translation, to 
borrow the language of the masthead of New York Times, that is ‘all the news 
fit to print’) during the Second World War.57 
The closest we have ever come to this was Dresden, also an aerial 
destruction, angels again, firebombed by the British, Bomber Harris who it is 
said, knew what he was doing. Winfried Sebald in the English version of his 
book The Natural History of Destruction58 used the nihilistic language of Lord 
                                                            
55 Robert Jungk, Strahlen aus der Asche. Geschichte einer Wiedergeburt, with a preface by 
Matthias Greffrath (Munich, 1991) [1959], p. 317; the English edition was published only two 
years later as Children of the Ashes. The Story of a Rebirth (London: Heinemann, 1961).   
56 Holger Nehring, “Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms. Interpretations of Nuclear 
Energy in the British and West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 1955-1964),” 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004):  150-170. Nehring cites Robert Jungk’s 
Strahlen aus der Asche. Geschichte einer Wiedergeburt, with a preface by Matthias Greffrath 
(Munich, 1991) [1959], p. 317.  Nehring also refers to Anders in the same time era. 
57 See David S. Bertolotti, “The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima” in Bertolotti, Culture and 
Technology (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1984), pp. 81-
112. 
58 W.G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Modern Library, 2004). 
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Solly Zuckerman, the architect of the Dresden firebombing, to title his book, 
and it is a fantastic title.59   The whole point, the whole purpose, the sole, the 
one and only end, of waging war is terror.60  
 
6. Anders Gesagt: Once More, with feeling 
 
A student of Husserl (again it is important to say this first) Anders was also a 
student of Heidegger as he was a student of Max Scheler (and Anders arguably 
gets his ethics from Scheler if not his practical sensibility). Scheler is beyond the 
scope of this paper but Heidegger as is already evident is central to the reading 
I have offered. If Anders’ scholars tend to eschew Heidegger (and if Heidegger 
scholars return the favor by ignoring Anders), Heidegger’s reflections on 
technology remain decisive for Anders. I argue that one needs to keep 
Heidegger’s criticisms in mind to read Anders (assuming to be sure Ander’s 
cutting critiques of Heidegger). To do this, it is necessary to go beyond the 
limits of Heidegger scholarship as even Heidegger scholars show little patience 
for the sustained and thoroughgoing character of Heidegger’s interest in 
technology as indeed in modern science, both which Heidegger thought in terms 
closer to Anders’ preoccupation with the same. Heidegger scholars can be the 
least valuable resource owing to their concern to excavate their personal 
favorite theme which means too that they tend to cut all references to 
Nietzsche, leaving Hölderlin (because who understands him?) and certainly 
mixing and matching Hölderlin and Rilke (why ever not?), all the while ending 
                                                            
59 Ibid. he quotes the Swedish journalist Stig Degerman’s 1946 report of nothing so much as a 
landscape of destruction at which no one of the inhabitants considered to look  “writing from 
Hamburg,” as Sebald describes the journalist’s report, “that on a train going at normal speed 
it took him a quarter of an hour to travel the lunar landscape between Hasselbrook and 
Landwehr, and in all that vast wilderness, perhaps the most horrifying expanse of ruins in 
the whole of Europe, he did not see a single living soul” Sebald, “Air War and Literature,” p. 
30. 
60 Karl Löwith’s “European Nihilism: Reflections on the Intellectual and Historical 
Background of the European War,” in Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 
Gary Steiner, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 173-284 as well as 
Karl Jaspers, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1961). For the specifically American context here, see Herman 
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) and for a 
discussion of Kahn from a present day context, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of 
Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press; 2005). 
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by nailing that personal interest to the wall as the whole of Heidegger: be it 
being, be it meaning, be it objects, be it god or God, or what have you.  
Here I have sought to emphasize that Heidegger, differently from Anders 
but also from Jaspers and from Löwith as well as Jünger, sought to criticize 
technology and in particular to criticize the sheer idea of the atomic bomb 
together with television and film, as Heidegger saw television and radio and 
film hermeneutico-phenomenologically in the visceral sense of both being and 
time.61 
A full elaboration of Heidegger and Anders goes far beyond the scope of this 
paper, though it is instructive to note that some elements of such a reading 
appear in Sloterdijk’s recent work. This is the sheer that of its having been  
(where the Nietzschean dialectic of the ‘having been’ reflects the essence of 
modern technology) as deployed, as put to use, as set in motion in addition to 
the bland politics of nuclear proliferation as this also functions as programmatic 
aggression advanced in the name of defense and deterrence.  The tactic of 
sheerly technological, automatic, mechanical, aggression is carried out in good 
conscience. The very notion of the “preemptive strike” is, as Jean Baudrillard 
observed again and again towards the end of his life, absolves the perpetrator 
(ergo it was not the English who would be blamed for Dresden, the oddness of 
Eatherly’s conscience was not that it, in Anders expression, burned but just 
that Americans simply have no blood on their hands for Hiroshima). Blame for 
the preemptive strike can always be laid at the opponent’s feet, it is his fault: 
such are the wages of evil.  
The claim of innocence was hard one for Eatherley,62 similar claims were 
hard on soldiers who had fought in Vietnam, especially after their return to 
everyday life in the United States, and the dissonance of the claim continues to 
be hard — we just call it post-traumatic stress now, denouncing it as we now do 
as a “disorder — for today’s fighters in the Gulf, Afghanistan, etc.  
Sloterdijk analyses this ‘schock” at the end of his book, The Critique of 
Cynical Reason, even going so far, and the present author is grateful for this, as 
to invoke Anders. But Anglophone readers looking for the next new thing have 
never read Anders (who was never the next new thing, perforce not, having 
never been translated into English) or Sloterdijk (who was) and those looking 
                                                            
61 See Babich, “Constellating Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s Die Gefahr / The 
Danger” in: Babette Babich and Dimitri Ginev, eds., The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology (Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2013), pp. 153-182.   
62 Claude Eatherly  & Günther Anders, Burning Conscience (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1962). 
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for today’s next new thing (and it is only today’s new thing that matters) cannot 
go back and read what they did not read in the first place. Thus we scholars 
trust young scholars who, as Nietzsche once expressed it, “have thoroughly 
unlearned the art of reading.” And by the time anyone notices a lack, those 
same scholars will have moved on to where they wished to be, all in time to be 
replaced by the next set of scholars seeking the next generation of the next new 
thing. 
The war on terrorism, as Slavoj Žižek observes, is infinitely fightable and 
wildly adaptable, transformable. Indeed, our enemies are beautifully invisible: a 
powerfully convenient antagonist and the invisible and therefore omnipresent 
enemy serves as today’s transformation, the perfection of the sheer automatism 
of war. The invisible enemy all around us is the equivalent of the acephalic and 
therefore perfect soldier of past war fantasies as Sloterdijk invokes these to 
conclude his Critique of Cynical Reason.63 Of course there is more, as the NSA 
has undone the old joke — we have met the enemy and he is us — by making it 
come true, literally so. Add to that the new laws hastily instituted everywhere 
criminalizing protest and “outing” anonymity.  What is certain is that with all 
the damage it has caused in recent decades and as it goes on and on, the war on 
terrorism is a war fought in good conscience and hence the perfect war for the 
“guiltlessly guilty”: who thus can fight infinitely and without remorse.  
And yet, and this is the full technological metal jacket. We do not stop there, 
we use other means, geological, meteorological means for waging war, and we 
pretend that we have no choice, we pretend that we need energy (although 
Anders pointed out that our perpetuation of our supposed need for energy was a 
calculated choice, a result of a politico-economic option to ignore the abundance 
of energy just for the economic sake and advantage of the strictures, the 
restrictions of pretended, affected, monetizable so-called limited resources that 
would then justify the utter destruction of the earth, water, air, everything. 
Obviously I am speaking of fracking but also deep sea drilling to go with the 
heedless destruction of the seas by industrializing fishing to reach proportions of 
the same apocalyptic force that is the theme of this essay.  
“What is decisive,” as Adorno wrote, “is the absorption of biological 
destruction by conscious social will.  Only a humanity to whom death has 
become as indifferent as its members, that has itself died, can inflict it 
                                                            
63 See again, Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason. I discuss these points further in Babich, 
“Sloterdijk’s Cynicism: Diogenes in the Marketplace” in: Stuart Elden, ed., Sloterdijk Now 
(Oxford: Polity, 2011), pp. 17-36 and pp. 186-189. 
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administratively on innumerable people.”64   And I would, extend this, as 
Adorno also would, to animals, I would extend this, as Nietzsche would, to the 
earth itself.  Our trouble, and hence our continued interest exactly in Eichmann 
– and not as Anders would say in “Eichmann’s sons,” for we are, all of, his 
children — where Eichmann is only pars pro toto, a word, a signifier for the 
story we tell ourselves that all our troubles in war, past and present, is always 
and only about the other: the Nazi, the Russian, the phantom Al Queda 
operative — like a Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle, an invisible, omnipresent, 
opponent so convenient that we could hardly resist inventing him, and so we 
did. If civilian death and the destruction of human, individual habitations and 
the conditions of maintaining a life was always both deliberate and regretted 
and thus a problem in war and so a necessary evil in the case of Dresden, 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, such deaths need no longer be regretted because they are 
no longer collateral. We send drones to kill civilians, we attack supposed 
‘terrorist’ sites and cells and incidentally, having to search them out at night, 
kill and rape (it’s night) women, children, and so on. We listen to Žižek because 
we no longer have Baudrillard to make these points, not that scholars ever 
listened to Baudrillard in his lifetime.  And indeed and for the same reasons, 
university scholars managed to pay no attention at all to Anders in his living 
years (why ever would we: just wait long enough and one can convert that 
attention into gold, that is: a university appointment of one’s own, which the 
younger scholars are already planning to set aside in their good time in favor of 
once, again, the next new thing, something with the word digital, or even better 
prefixed with a non- or an anti-.  
Thus rather than reading Anders’ critique of the bomb as limited to a time 
we call the Atomic Age — as Anders himself varied Samuel Beckett’s 1957 
Endgame (Fin de partie) as Endzeit that is “Endtime,”65 here invoking the 
eschatological language of Jacob Taubes as Anders does —this essay connects 
his reflections on the bomb with his critique of technology and the obsolescence 
of humanity as of a piece with our dedication to hurling ourselves against our 
own mortality. This concern with the violence of technology, this hatred of the 
vulnerability of having been born and having been set on a path unto death 
(the mortal path that is the path of life) inspires Anders’ engagement with the 
sons of Eichmann — the heirs of those who designed and executed the Nazi 
death camps and extermination chambers of the Holocaust — and the sons of 
                                                            
64 Adorno, Minima Moralia (London: Verso, 1997 [1974], p. 233). 
65 Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gedanken über die atomare Situation (Munich: Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 1972 [1950]). 
Angels, the Space of Time, and Apocalyptic Blindness: On Günther Anders’ Endzeit–Endtime 
 
174 
 
Claude Eatherly — the heirs of both those who designed and those who as pilots 
(banality of banality) deployed the bombings that exploded nothing but the 
stuff of the sun itself against the Empire of the Sun in the attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. We, embroiled as we are in wartime after wartime, suppressing 
public protest on a scale like never before, in country after country across the 
globe, cannot dispense with reflecting on that same legacy. 
We stop short of bluntness and Anders was blunt. We need as much of that 
as we can get. 
